Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological Building on and extending Fodor’s earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat of. Mind. ( hence. RTM. ; for discussion see., among other sources.,. Fodor.,. FA. ; Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of. Mind Jerry Fodor, as the leading philosophical exponent of cognitive science, has sparked.

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Not sure what the problem is here. As Dan suggested, we could actually pull an informational analysis of that. Is this purely a case of sexual selection, or is symmetry a fitness-producer for other reasons? The stuff about following Stich and Dennett will, of course, be controversial.

His arguments from the publicity of determinate content do not strike me as at all persuasive. It seems to me that the contents of these states have a great deal to do with their relations to other mental states.

Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics

Myself, my main concern is with human mental representation, which I attacked via the neuroscientific route. And I also share your doubts that lack of complete success adds up to fdor failure. To be sure, there are more stringent unpackings of the notion of tracking, but let us concede that this is the psyhosemantics one. This rigid, inflexible behavior contrasts sharply with the behaviors of rats, who learn quickly and hence respond flexibly to obstacles and threats.

Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers

Maybe it was instead just a widely held view. According to Millikan, you have to figure out what the most general, proximal explanation is for its selection. One is to just agree with the unidentified Rutgers peeps: Emotions, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals. This rethinking will involve looking again at some of the ideas of the nay sayers of the s, like Dennett and Stich, but looking further afield as well. About the thin view speculative and impressionistic—my apologies: You seem to take emotion to have less to do with conceptual representation than propositional thought does.


Fodor – – In Psychosemantics. I think that the beaver sort of case is actually just one of a myriad in the animal communication literature and the kinds of scientists who do the animal communication stuff and not the kinds of scientists who do neuroscience. With some sadness and much caution, I suggest that things have not gone well for the Dretske-Fodor program.

The focus on what you call perception, both in your comments and in much contemporary neuroscience has advantages, but also drawbacks. The flexibility of their behavior leads us to posit states in the rat that go well beyond simple detection and sensory-motor connections.

Or is it that I have a multiply-interpretable sensory experience that I take to be about HORSES, given my background beliefs, theories, past evidence, etc.?

My point was that none of the naturalistic accounts on offer — specifically, versions of information-theoretic and teleological semantics — suffice to pick out fine-grained, determinate content of the sort we assume mental representation requires. In my view an adequate theory must address both issues of input causality and of output causality behavioral dispositions and the like.

Does Semantics Run the Psyche? Find it on Scholar. I must have forgotten about it by the time I finished reading all of the other comments.

I take it that your argument goes something like this: Dretske brought the baby back in from the puddle of bathwater, and the baby is here to stay even though it is not sufficient and nobody has ever said it was sufficient: This seems a reasonable approach.

My sense was that you seemed rather dismissive of this problem of informational specificity. Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind.

The rough idea is that we have internal models with teleosemantically determined contentsand those models can psyhosemantics various causal roles to implement the attitudes — classic psychofunctionalism, really.


Psychosemantics Quotes

But even this would just be an extra layer of content over top of the standard face and symmetry detector contents. Dan, thanks psychosemantica posting the link.

Sure, at some level it also increases fitness but that sort of misses the causal point: There are vast numbers of local fitness enhancing states of affairs presence of food, presence of mate, presence of predator etc. Millikan requires that the producer is able to effect a correspondence according to some mapping rule between the representation produced and some world affair. Eric Mandelbaum – – Inquiry: Is it hard to fit into a Dretskian framework?

Phototransducers increase fitness because they convert light into voltage fluctuations. What the teleosemantic theory seems to be committed to is the idea that the visual system does not represent facial symmetry, but reproductive fitness.

Or am I completely missing the point here? They were on the right track, but not quite there yet.

Was Psychosemantics a Failure?

So, my sense was that the basic problem was out there. It might use something much simpler like the spike rate or count because fodlr things can more readily influence downstream neuronal networks. There are many different issues that people raise about intentionality. Why think they know anything about the semantics, rather than the information flow?

Hi Ken — Sorry for the delayed reply; I was away camping. Foodor I take your point—the worries have their standing with or without Fodor. But what does that look like? Maybe I was the one that suggested this was something of a consensus view. I think what Dan says is interesting: